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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THE 
MECHANICS LIEN OF DEFENDANT INVALID SINCE IT 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW. 
Defendant-Respondent has attempted to divert this 
Court's attention from the true issue of this case i.e., 
whether the lien as filed by Defendant meets the require-
ments mandated by Utah law. Instead, Defendant has 
focused its response upon a claim that Appellants are 
attempting to argue that the "substantial compliance" 
standard has been abandoned in Utah and that "technical 
inconsistencies" will now invalidate all Utah liens. 
(Defendant's Brief, p. 4). 
Appellants have never argued before this Court that 
the substantial compliance doctrine is no longer in effect 
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in Utah. Appellants agree that a supplier or laborer should 
not be deprived of his lien merely because of a minor mistake 
in the execution of the lien notice. The courts of this 
state as well as all states throughout the country liberally 
support a claimant when in fact the mistake is of minor 
importance and does not substantively affect the validity of 
the lien. 
However, as noted by Defendant itself a mechanics lien 
is a creature of statute and "must therefore be in complete 
compliance with all statutory prerequisites to its validity." 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 4-5). 
The question as to whether a "technical" deficiency or 
a substantive statutory deficiency has resulted must be 
determined on a case by case basis. Respondent cites, for 
example, the Lewis v. Midway Lumber, Inc. decision of the 
Arizona Court of Appeals and quotes language that substantial 
compliance is sufficient to validate a lien. However, while 
the court recognized the doctrine of substantial compliance 
it nevertheless invalidated the liens since the claimants 
had failed to correctly name the owner of the subject property 
or to serve the owner with proper notice. The court there 
held that such failure could not be said to have substantially 
complied with the statutory requirements of Arizona law. 
As to this particular case, there can be no doubt that 
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Defendant failed to properly verify the lien as is required 
by Utah law. Defendant argues that because Mr. Buttars 
signed his name in the signature portion of the notice that 
this signature could be imputed to the verification portion 
and that in fact the notary was notarizing Buttars' signature. 
As can be seen from an examination of the lien claim, 
however, such an argument stretches all interpretation of 
documents. The lien form prepared by Defendant itself provides 
that an agent of Boise Cascade Corporation must first sign the 
form as would any lien claimant. Second, however, the verifi-
cation portion of the form allows for a second agent to verify 
the contents and truth of the lien. In this case, for example, 
an officer authorized to file liens could have signed the 
signature portion of the form whereas a local manager who 
actually sold the products may have been required to verify 
the truth of the contents contained in the form. Thus, two 
completely separate individuals could have signed the material-
men' s notice and claim lien and may have actually been required 
to do so under the Boise Cascade Corporation structure. 
In any event, the verification block does not state who 
is first being duly swor~ upon oath but instead leaves a blank 
in this portion. Not only is the name omitted as to who is 
swearing but there is no signature on the bottom line indicating 
that the oath has actually been taken. 
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Defendant states that the Alaska Supreme Court case of 
Stevenson v. Ketchican Spruce Mills, Inc. is "factually identical 
to the instant case." This statement is incorrect. In that 
case a signature block was signed by Lyle E. Anderson, manager 
of Ketchican Spruce Mills, Inc. just as the signature was 
signed by Bert Buttars, Boise Cascade's agent. However, in 
the jurat of the notary it is stated "Lyle E. Anderson, being 
first duly sworn, upon oath, deposes and says." It then states 
that he is the "manager of Ketchican Spruce Mills, Inc." and 
makes the verification on behalf of the corporation. The line 
below the jurat was left blank. 
In Stevenson there could be no doubt that Lyle Anderson, 
the same person who had signed the signature portion of the 
lien, was the same person who had taken an oath before the 
notary public. This, plus the fact that Alaska specifically 
has a statute concerning substantial compliance distinguishes 
the Stevenson case from the instant appeal. 
Likewise, Defendant cites the case of Anchorage Sand & 
Gravel Co., Inc. v. Wooldridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska, 1980) 
in support of its position that omission of the signature line 
following the jurat again is substantial performance with the 
lien requirement. In that case, however, the corporate 
officer signed his name in the correct location and the jurat 
specifically stated that Buff V. Jacobsen signed the oath. The 
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sole argument in Wooldridge was whether the language contained 
in the jurat was sufficient to constitute a verification and 
not whether the signature of the claimant was properly executed. 
In the instant case Appellants do not dispute that the language 
contained in the Boise Cascade form would have been a correct 
verification had the notary recognized that Buttars appeared 
before him and had Buttars actually signed the correct portion 
of the form. 
The First Security Mortgage Co. case written by Justice 
Howe and the H.A.M.S. Co. case of Alaska are germane to this 
appeal only to the effect that verification and its language 
is a critical and absolute requirement of a valid lien and cannot 
be overlooked as can other errors made in the lien form. The 
H.A.M.S. Co. case specifically defined the word "verify" in 
accordance with conunon law usage as follows: 
To confirm or substantiate by oath . . . . 
Particularly used of making formal oath to 
accounts, petitions, pleadings, and other papers. 
. . . The word "verified" when used in a statute, 
ordinarly imports a verity attested by the sanctity 
of an oath. . . . To prove to be true; to establish 
the truth of; to confirm; to confirm the truth or 
truthfulness of; to check or test the accuracy or 
exactness of; to confirm or establish the authenticity 
of; to authenticate; to prove. 563 P.2d 260, quoting 
Black's Law Dictionary, 1732-33 (4th Ed. 1951). 
These decisions point out the fact that verification is 
not a "mere technicality" but is one of the essential elements 
of a valid lien claim. Just as an affidavit requires an oath 
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to become a valid affidavit a lien claim requires an oath 
to be verified if it is to have any legal effect. It is 
just as illogical to say that an affidavit with no name 
and which is unsigned is valid and proper for judicial use 
as to say that a lien claim which has no name and which is 
unsigned is valid under the lien statutes. 
Whether the failure of Defendant to properly include 
the name of the individual to whom Defendant furnished 
materials on the lien form as required by statute is a "tech-
nicality" or is a material omission depends upon an examination 
of the entire form and the purpose for such requirement. 
The statute 38-1-7, U.C.A. requires both the name of the 
owner and the name of the person hiring the contractor or to 
whom the materials were furnished. Again, the owner and the 
person requesting the materials or work may not be the same 
and therefore both sources of information are statutorily 
required. It is difficult to understand how defendant can 
argue it substantially complied with the requirment of 
furnishing the information as to who employed it when there 
is no information whatsoever relating to this issue. The 
real question is whether the omission of that information 
invalidates the lien as a matter of law or whether it can be 
overlooked as a technical deficiency. 
Appellants would argue that those items specifically 
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listed in the statute as being required cannot be so overlooked 
and that only items not specifically enumerated or items which 
are enumerated but not as to the specific form of enumeration 
should be given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to validate 
an erroneous lien form. 
Finally, Defendant argues that equity demands that the 
lien be given effect in this case. The law is well settled, 
however, that equity has no place in determining mechanics liens. 
The Supreme Court of Kansas in Ekstrom United Supply Co. v. 
Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement Co., 400 P. 2d 707 (Kan. 1965) 
stated the following: 
It is a settled rule in this state that 
equitable considerations do not give rise to 
a mechanic's lien. Being created by statute, 
a mechanic's lien only arises under the cir-
cumstances and in the manner prescribed by 
the statute. A lien claimant must secure a 
lien under the statute or not at all. 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Arizona in the Lewis, supra, 
made a similar comment when it stated: 
Appellees argue that any failure to follow 
the statute in this case was not prejudicial. 
We do not agree. If a default or neglect is 
material to the perfection of a lien, it is 
beyond the remedial scope of equity, in the 
exercise of its usual powers, to protect the 
lien claimant against the untoward consequences 
of what may be and probably was his own neglect. 
The courts cannot read into either the statutes 
or the claim of lien what is not there, or take 
from either what is there. Id. at 756. 
The reasons for this doctrine are simple. In many cases 
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two innocent parties are pitted against each other as in 
the instant case. The laborer or supplier is entitled to 
compensation for his work or materials. On the other hand, 
the homeowner is generally the opponent of the claimant. 
The homeowner has purchased the home and paid for it fully 
from the contractor. Both the lien claimant and the home-
owner are victims of a defaulting contractor. Both are 
entitled to protection under the law. If the lien claimant 
properly complies with statutory lien laws which are in 
derogation to common law, then that claimant is given the 
advantage over the homeowner. If, on the other hand, the 
lien claimant fails to comply with these statutory mandates 
the homeowner must prevail. Neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendant is free from fault in this case. The plaintiffs 
purchased the propery even though a lien had been filed 
against it. Plaintiffs should have inquired as to the effect 
of such lien before consummating the purchase. They did not. 
Defendant, on the other hand, is a national corporation which 
has no doubt filed thousands of liens and yet incorrectly 
stated the name of the employer and failed to properly verify 
the lien claim. The defendant too, then, was negligent in 
its business affairs. 
It is unfortunate that one of these two parties must 
suffer when the true culprit is the contractor which is not 
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even a party to this lawsuit and which is totally without 
assets. However, just as in many cases of statutory law, 
advantages or disadvantages are gained or lost upon compliance 
with rules, statutes, and regulations. In the instant case, 
had Defendant properly followed the statute it would have 
gained .the advantage of a lien upon Plaintiffs' property 
even though Plaintiffs were not a party to the original 
transaction. Having failed to follow the statute, however, 
this advantage is lost and Defendant can only seek compen-
sation under normal channels of contractual law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the preceding reasons, therefore, the lien upon 
Plaintiffs' home should be declared invalid and the judgment 
of the lower court reversed. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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